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THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
CORPORATIONS
The law concerning the criminal responsibility of corpo-
rations has had a gradual evolution and development.' The
earlier decisions have been greatly modified by the more
modern view of the nature and responsibilities of a corpora-
tion, and today there is a wide and apparently increasing
field of crimes for which corporations may be held respon-
sible . 2 In the "constantly broadening and widening juris-
prudence on the subject" there appear to have been four
periods.
THE FIRST PERIOD
It has been frequently asserted that it was the original
rule of the common law that a corporation was in no case
criminally responsible. 3 These statements seem to be based
'Southern Express Co. vs. St., 1 Ga. App. 700, 58 S. E. 67.
In St. vs. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389, 111 Pac. 474,
L. R. A. 1915 D. 515, it is said that the development in case of
statutory crimes has been rapid. In Com. vs. Punxsutawney St.
Ry. Co., 24 Pa. C. C. 445, rapid development is apparently depreci-
ated.
220 Harvard Law R. 321; 14 Columbia Law R. 241.
3Com. vs. Pulaski County A. & M. Assn., 92 Ky. 197, 17 S. W. 442;
U. S. vs. MacAndrews, 149 Fed. 823; P. M. Clarke, 14 N. Y.
Supp. 642; Union Colliery Co. vs. Queen, 31 Can. S. C. 81, 2 B. R.
C. 222. This doctrine has also been asserted by some of the con-
tinental jurists. Merkel, Hoetz Shof. 11,111; Gieb, Lehrbuch, Sec.
87.
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principally upon a dictum of Lord Holt, who is reported to
have said, "A corporation is not indictable, but the particu-
lar members are."
In criticism of this statement it has been said that
aside from the apocryphal character of the so-called Mod-
ern Reports, and the suspicion which always attaches to
anonymous cases reported therein,5 it is certain that there
were, in Holt's time, many instances of indictments against
counties, which were quasi corporations, for failure to keep
bridges and highways in repair. 6 The same doctrine, how-
ever, was asserted by Blackstone, who said, "A corporation
cannot commit treason or felony or other crime in its cor-
porate capacity. " These statements are the foundation of
dicta to the same effect in some of the earlier cases in this
country. 8
In spite of these statements, it is altogether probable
that there never was a time when corporations were entirely
without criminal responsibility," and it seems certain that
under the commercial development which the last two gen-
4Anon. 12 Mod. 559, (1701). In the ancient case of Abbott of
Saint Bennett's vs. Mayor of Norwick (1482) Y. B. 21 Edw. IV.
713, Pigot, arguendo, said that corporations cannot do felony or
treason as far as the corporation is concerned." See also Hobbes,
Leviathan, ch. 22.
5The editors of these reports seem to have been mere private
note takers and not officially appointed reporters. Lord Holt com-
plained of them saying: "The stuff which they publish would make
posterity think Ill of his understanding and that of his brethren on
the bench." Probably the statement about corporations was one of
those which elicited this complaint. See St. vs. Morris & E. R.
Co., 23 N. J. L. 360.
614a C. J. 871; St. vs. Morris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360.
See also Beg. vs, Birmingham & G. R. Co., 3 Q. B. 223.
7Chap. 18, Sec. 12. Blackstone cites the case of Sutton's Hos.
pital, which holds simply that a corporation cannot commit treason.
St. vs. Morris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360.
SSee McKim vs. Odorn (1828) 3 Bland Ch. 407; Orr vs. Bank
of U. S. (1822) 1 Ohio 36: St. vs. Great Works Co., (1841) 20 Me.
41; McDaniel vs. Great City, etc., Co., (1887) 79 Ga. 58; Com. vs.
Swift Run, etc., Co., 2 Va. Cas. 362.
95 Fletcher on Corporations, 5370; St. vs. Morris & E. R. Co.,
23 N. J. L. 360; Southern Ry. Co. vs. St. 125 Ga. 287, 54 S. E.
160, 5 Ann. Cas. 411.
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erations have witnessed, corporations have become so num-
erous and powerful that there would be grave public dan-
ger in continuing to permit them to enjoy this immunity,'0
It seems to be true, however, that though there were many
instances to be found in the earlier decisions in which cor-
porations were held criminally responsible,1 and the
"course of precedents" to that effect had "been uniform for
centuries and the doctrine frequently taken for granted both
in arguments and by the judges,"' 2 the responsibility of a
corporation for crime was not expressly adjudicated in
Westminster Hall until the case of Queen vs. Birmingham
and Glocester Railway Co.1
3
THE SECOND PERIOD
In this case it was expressly decided that a corporation
was responsible for crimes of nonfeasance. The same prin-
ciple has been repeatedly recognized in both the English
and the American courts, and it is now universally held that
a corporation may be held criminally responsible for non-
feasance. '4 The existence of the criminal responsibility of
corporations beyond this point has been a matter of gradual
growth, which has progressed in varying degrees in various
jurisdictions 15
'oKenny,. Crim. L. 58. In some jurisdictions where the crimin-
al law is entirely statutory it has been held that a corporation can-
not be indicted for crime except as specially provided by statute.
See St. vs. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 186 Ind. 248; 115 N. E.
772; St. vs. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co., 24 0. S. 611. Corporations
are now made criminally responsible by statute in Indiana. St.
vs. B. & 0. R. Co., 120 Ind. 298; 22 N. E. 307. In the Phillipines
it has been held that the courts have no power except such as Is
conferred by statute and there is no provision whereby corporations
may be proceded against criminally. West Coast Ins. Co. vs.
Hurd, 27 Phillipine 401.
12 B. R. C. 231 note; 19 Michigan Law R. 206.
1-Talfourd, Sergeant, In Queen vs. Railway Co., 3 Q. B. 227.
See also Morris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360.
13b Car. & Payne, 469, 3 Q. B. 223; St. vs. Morris & E. R.
Co., 23 X. J. L. 360.
1
4
14a C. J. 872; 2 B. R. C. 232 and cases cited; Southern Ry.
Co. vs. St. 125'Ga. 287; 5 Ann. Cas, 411 and cases cited in note; St.
vs. Mrorris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360.
.;2 B. I,. C. 233.
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It is generally assumed that corporations were held
criminally responsible for nonfeasance long before they were
held responsible for misfeasance. 16 The early English cases
in which the responsibility of corporations was assumed but
not expressly adjudicated seem all to have been cases of
nonfeasance;'7 in Queen vs. Birmingham and Gloucester
Railway Co., the prosecuting counsel expressly distinguish-
ed misfeasance and nonfeasance, and seemed to admit that
an indictment would not lie for the former, and it has been
argued that this distinction was adopted by the court;"s and
in this country some of the courts were at first inclined to
hold that corporations were responsible for nonfeasance, but
not for misfeasance.' 9 Thus in State vs. Great Works Co.,
the court said, "Corporations * * * can neither commit a
crime or misdemeanor by any positive affirmative act, or in-
cite others to do it as a corporation. 20 But in State vs. Mor-
ris and E. R. Co., 21 Green, C. J., said that he was aware of
only two cases in which this question had been directly pre-
16P. V. Clark, 14 N. Y. S. 169; Union Colliery Co. vs. Queen, 31
Can. S. C. 81, 2 B. R. C. 222; St. vs. L. V. R. R. Co., 90 N. J. L.
372; C. vs. Pulaski County A. & M. Assn., 92 Ky. 197, 17 S. W.
442; 20 Harvard Law R. 321; 19 Michigan Law R. 205. But in Stand-
ard Oil Co. vs. St., 117 Tenn. 618, 10 L. R. A. N. S. 1015, 100 S.
W. 705, the court said: "Corporations could under the common law
commit crimes of both nonfeasance and hisfeasance."
1719 Michigan Law R. 205; 2 B. R. C. 232. It does not appear
whether the indictment in the case decided by Lord Holt, see supra,
was for nonfeasance or misfeasance. Counsel, arguendo, In Queen
vs. Great North of England R. Co., 9 Q. B. 315.
1SCounsel, arguendo, in Queen vs. Great North of England R.
Co. But in this case the court said: "The late case of Queen vs.
Birmingham, etc., R. Co., was confined to the state of things then
before the court, which amounted to nonfeasance only; but was by
no means intended to deny the liability of a corporation for misfeas-
ance.
l9Com. vs. Swift Run, etc., Co., 2 Va. Cas. 362; St. vs. Ohio
& M. R. Co., 23 Ind. 362.
2OThe doctrine of this case was said, in St. vs. Portland, etc.,
74 Me. 268, to have been denied in St. vs. Vermont CentralR. Co.
27 Vt. 103, and St. vs. Morris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360, and
to have been disregarded in St. vs. Freeport, 43 Me. 198, and St.
vs. Portland & H. R. Co., 57 Me. 402.
21Supra.
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sented for judicial decision. State vs. Great Works Co. 22
and Queen vs. Great North of England R. Co.,23 and these
were directly in conflict.
THE THIRD PERIOD
The difficulty of distinguishing a misfeasance from a
nonfeasance and the "startling incongruity of allowing an
exemption in one case and not in the other," caused an early
repudiation of the doctrine that a corporation is responsible
for nonfeasance but not for misfeasance. Within a few
years after the English court expressly decided in Queen
vs. Birmingham and D. R. Co.,24 that a corporation was li-
able for nonfeasance, the same court, in the case of Queen
vs. Great North of England R. Co.,25 "after solemn argu-
ment and deliberate advisement," decided -that a corporation
was responsible for crimes of misfeasance.
26
In this case the court, after stating that "the question
is, whether an indictment will lie at common law against
a corporation for misfeasance, it being admitted, in con-
formity with undisputed decisions that an indictment may
be maintained against a corporation for nonfeasance," said
that "no assumption could be no more unfounded" than that
"there is a plain and obvious distribution between the two
species of offenses," 27 and that even if the distinction were
easily discoverable, there was no reason why a corporation
should be responsible for one species and not for the
other.
2 8
A similar extension of the responsibility of corporations
to crimes of misfeasance was made in this country in the
2-Supra.
23Supra.
24Supr.
2. Supra.
2GThis case has been followed on many occasions and cited with
approval by the House of Lords. Union Colliery Co. vs. Queen 31
Can. S. C. 81, 2 B. R. C. 222.
271f A is authorized to make a bridge with parapets but makes
It without them, does the offense consist of the construction of an
unsecured bridge or In the neglect to secure it"
28"It is as easy to charge a body corporate with erecting a bar
across a public road as with the non-repair of It."
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cases of State vs. Morris and E. R. Co. 2 9 and Common-
wealth vs. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge. 30 In the lat-
ter case the court, in ruling adversely to the contention that
a corporation is not responsible for misfeasance, said, "There
are dicta in some of the early cases which sanction this
broad doctrine, and it has been copied into the text writers,
and adopted to its full extent in a few modern decisions.
But if it ever had any foundation, it had its origin when
corporations were few in number and limited in their powers
and in the purposes for which they were created. Exper-
ience has shown the necessity for essentially modifying it.
The distinction between a nonfeasance and a misfeasance
is often one more of form than substance. There are cases
where it would be difficult to say whether the offense con-
sisted in the doing of an unlawful act or in the doing of a
lawful act in an improper manner. The difficulty of dis-
tinguishing the character of these offenses strongly illus-
trates the absurdity of the doctrine that a corporation is in-
dictable for a nonfeasance but not for a misfeasance."
These cases have been followed in many others, and the
distinction between the criminal responsibility for misfeas-
ance and nonfeasance is now universally held to be unten-
able.3  It has been said that the extension of responsibility
to misfeasance, which was confessedly a departure from the
earlier rule, was made necessary by changed conditions,
whether or not it was justified by logical argument.
3 2
LIMITATIONS
The doctrine that a corporation was criminally respon-
29Supra.
302 Gray 339.
31
14a C. J. 872 and cases cited; 3 B. R. C. 233 and cases cfted;
St. vs. Salisbury Ice Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737, Ann. Cas.
1916 C 456 and note. In St. vs. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 83
Kan. 389, 111 Pac. 474, L. R. A. 1915 D 515, the court said: "Other
states, notably Indiana and Maryland, hold to the ancient doctrine
that a corporation cannot be indicted for misfeasance." In Dela-
ware, etc., Coal Co. vs. Cm., 60 Pa. 367. the court said: "'As a
general rule they are not indictable for misfeasance unless they as-
sume the shape of nuisances."
32St. vs. L. V. R. R. Co., 90 N. J. L. 372.
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sible for misfeasance as well as nonfeasance was qualified
by two limitations:
(1) A corporation could not be guilty of a crime invol-
ving injury to the person.
(2) A corporation could not be guilty of a crime in-
volving criminal intent.
CRIMES INVOLVING INJURY TO PERSON
The doctrine that a corporation cannot be held respon-
sible for crimes involving injury to the person was asserted
in those cases, in both England and the United States, in
which it was first expressly decided that a corporation was
responsible for misfeasance, 33 and has been adhered to in
some of the more modern cases ." By reason of its applica-
tion it has been asserted that a corporation cannot be guilty
of assault and battery, riot or homicide.
35
CRIMES INVOLVING A CRIMINAL INTENT
In the cases in which the criminal responsibility of
corporations was first extended to misfeasances,3 6  there
were strong dicta that such liability extended only to mis-
feasances which did not involve a criminal intent, 7 and this
doctrine has been asserted in some of the more modern
cases.-3  It is too plain to require argument that this in-
tangible entity cannot do any act requiring any mental, mo-
33Queen vs. Great North of England R. Co.; Com. vs. Proprie-
tors of Bedford Bridge; St. vs. Morris & E. R. Co.
3 4Com. vs. Punxsutawney Street Ry. Co., 24 Pa. C. C. 25;
Com. vs. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 152 Ky. 320; 153 S. W. 459, 45 L.
R. A. N. S. 344, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 617; 14a C. J. 875. But see
infra.
3514a C. J. 875; Queen vs. Great Western Laundry Co., 3 Can.
Crim. Cas. 514; Delaware Division Canal Co., 60 Pa. 367: and
cases cited in previous note. "Homicide in any of its degrees is
not an offense for which a corporation may be indicted." Com.
vs. Illinois, etc., R. Co.
3 EQueen vs. Great North of England Rt. Co.; St. vs. Morris &
E5. R. Co.; Com. vs. Proprietors of Bedford Bridge, supra.
'720 Harvard Law R. 321; 19 Michigan Law R. 205.
331 4 a C. J. 874: St. vs. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 98 S.
W. 539; St. vs. Western North Carolina R. Co., 95 N. C. 602;
St. vs. First National Bank, 2 S. D. 658, 51 N. W. 587; Com. vs.
Punxsutawney Street Ry. Co., supra; Com. vs. Illnois, etc., R.
Co., supra; Queen vs. Great Western Laundry Co., supra.
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ral, or spiritual process, or any act, as it is more frequently
put, requiring intent."3 9
It seems, however, that most of the authority to this
effect consists of dicta,40 and that in the cases in which the
question has been directly presented the courts have usual-
ly found no difficulty in making the necessary imputation ;41
and the application of the doctrine has been rendered ex-
tremely difficult by the failure of the courts to define clearly
what they mean by a crime of which intent is an essential
element.
42
THE FOURTH PERIOD
The fact that limitations to the general rule of corpor-
ate responsibility for crime "are rapidly crumbling away is
amply demonstrated by recent cases. 4 It is certain that
there is an undoubted tendency in recent decisions in many
of the state courts, and especially in the federal courts, to
subject corporations to the same criminal responsibility as
corporations.44 So many businesses of every kind are now
carried on by corporations, that it would render nugatory, it
is said, many criminal laws for the benefit of the public if
they did not apply to the misconduct of corporations in cases
in which the laws would apply to the same conduct by an
individual. 45
39Counsel, arguendo, 29 R. I. 254, 17 Ann. Cas. 96. See also
Wych vs. Meal, 3 Pr. Wins 310 (1734); Sutton's Hospital Case, 10
Coke 1; Androscoggen, etc., Co. vs. Bethel, etc. Co., 64 Me. 441.
402 B. R. C. 238; U.' S. vs. MacAndrews, etc.. Co.. 149 Fed.
823.
412 B. R. C. 238.
4 2
1n St. vs. V. L. V. R. R. Co., the court said: "We need
not consider what crimes cay be included in the last exception." In
Com. vs. Illinois, etc., R. Co., the court said that the exception
included such offenses as are often grouped under the three fold
designation of treason, felony, and breach of peace." See infra.
4319 Michigan Law R. 206.
-
4 4
Joplin Mercantile Co. vs. U. S. 213 Fed. 926, Ann. Cas.
1916 C 470; 20 Harvard Law R. 321; 14 Columbia Law R. 477. As
to the validity of a statute making it a crime for a corporation to
do or omit what an individual may do without incurring criminal
responsibility, see St. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 124 Tenn. 1, 135
U. S. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912 D. 805.
45St. vs. Salisburg Ice Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737, Ann.
'las. 1916 C. 456.
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CRIMES INVOLVING INTENT
There are many recent cases, and the number seems to
be rapidly increasing, in which it is asserted that a corpo-
ration may be held responsible for crimes of which intent
is an essential element,46 and it has been said that the great
weight of modern authority supports this view.' 7 In many
of these cases the assertion was mere dictum, as the point
was not really involved in the decision,48 but there are a
considerable number of decisions which hold that a corpora-
tion may be criminally responsible for a crime of which in-
tent is an essential ingredient,49 and statements to the con-
trary are " but the remnant of a theory always fanciful and
in the process of abandonment.°
Thus it has been held that a corporation may be held
criminally responsible for larceny, 1 false pretences, conspi-
racy, "knowingly and fraudulently concealing property,"
2
"knowingly depositing unavailable matter in the mails,"5 3
"knowingly assisting the importation of contract laborers,"5 '
"wilfully and unlawfully destroying property. "56
462 B. R. C. 240 and cases cited; Telegram, etc., Co. vs. Com.
172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445, 44 L. R. A. 159; St. vs. Grant Bros.
Const. Co., 13 Ariz. 388, 114 Pae. 955; P. vs. Rochester Railway &
Light Co., 195 N. Y. 102, 88 N. E. 22, 21 L. R. A. N. S. 998, 16
Ann. Cas. 837.
47Joplin Mercantile Co. vs. U. S., 213 Fed. 926, Ann. Cas.,
1916 E. 470. See also Ann. Cas., 1916 C. 461n.
4814 Columbia Law R. 475; U. S. vs. Alaska Packers' Assn., 1
Alaska 217; St. vs. Passaic County Agr. Assn., 54 N. J. L. 269;
P. vs. Star Co., 135 App. Div. 517.
4914a C. J. 874; 14 Columbia Law R. 476; 27 Harvard Law R.
589.
50U. S. vs. MacAndrews, 149 Fed. 823; St. vs. Rowland Lum-
ber Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 610, 69 S. E. 554; P. vs. Dunbar Con-
tracting Co., 215 N. Y. 416, 109 N .E. 554; St. vs. Baltimore, etc.
R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362.
51p. vs. Tyson & Co., 50 N. Y. L. J. Jan. 13, 1914; St. vs.
Salisbury Ice Co., supra.; U. S. vs. MacAndrews, etc., Co., supra.
52U. S. vs. Young & Co., 170 Fed.- 110.
53U. S. vs. N. Y. Herald, 159 Fed. 296.
GIGrant Bros. Const. Co. vs. St., supra.
56St. vs. Rowland Lumber Co., supra. See also, P. vs. Hud-
son, etc., Co., 217 N. E. 172, 111 N. E. 472; St. vs. White, 96 Mo.
Ap. 34, 69 S. W. 684; P. vs. Dunbar Contracting Co., 213 N. Y.
416, 109 N. E. 554.
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CRIMES INVOLVING INJURY TO THE PERSON
There are also recent cases in which it has been held
that a corporation may be held responsible for a crime in-
volving injury to the person. 57 Thus it has been held that
a corporation may be held for the statutory crime of omit-
ting without lawful excuse to perform the duty of avoiding
danger to life from anything in its charge or under its con-
trol, though death resulted as the result of the omission and
the facts would have supported an indictment for manslaugh-
ter against an individual, 5 and that a corporation may be
held responsible for involuntary manslaughter. 59
FELONIES
It has been asserted that a corporation cannot be held
responsible for a felony. 60 The reason usually given is that
in case of felonies the law does not provide punishments ap-
plicable to corporations.6' It is manifest, however, that
"whether a corporation can be convicted of a criminal of-
fense depends not upon the technical name, treason, felony,
or misdemeanor attached to the crime,62 and that if the law
provides a punishment which is applicable to corporations,
a corporation may be held responsible for a felony.6 3 It has
been suggestet that an amendment of "our system of crim-
inal procedure providing for adequate punishments for cor-
porations whose duly accredited agents are guilty of a fel-
57See St. vs. B. & 0. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362.
5SUnion Colliery Co. vs. Queen, supra.
59St. vs. L. V. R. R. Co., supra. The court said that the
common law had been modified by the decision In St. vs. Morris &
E. R. Co., and the cases following that decision, and that under
these decisions the indictment could be sustained. Four members
dissented on the ground that the common law had not been modi-
fied to that extent and that the point involved had not been decided
by prior decisions. See also P. vs. Rochester Railway & Light Co.,
supra.
OSt. vs. Morris & E. R. Co.; Com. vs. Pulaski County A. &
M_ Assn.
615 Fletcher on Corporations 5393; 0. vs. Pulaski County A. &
M. Assn.
eSJoplin Mercantile Co. vs. U. S.,,supra.
63U. S. vs. Alaska Packers' Assn., 1 Alaska 217; Joplin Mer-
cantile Co., supra.
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ony," is needed. 6- But, in some jurisdictions, the courts
seems to obviate the necessity for such an amendment.65
BASIS OF RESPONSIBILITY
The theoretical basis of the criminal responsibility of
corporations is a matter of some difficulty and debate. In
extending this responsibility the tendency has been to brush
aside the various theoretical difficulties, and justify the ex-
tension on grounds of policy rather than of logic.
REASONS FOR IRRESPONSIBILITY
The reasons usually given for the total or partial ir-
responsibility of corporations are:
(1) A corporation cannot commit a criminal act.
(2) A corporation cannot have a criminal intent.
(3) Criminal procedure is inapplicable to corpora-
tions.
(4) To hold a corporation responsible is to punish the
innocent stockholders.
(5) The persons who actually commit the crime may
be held responsible and therefore it is not necessary to hold
the corporation.
(6) Certain crimes from their very nature cannot be
commited by corporations.
CRIMINAL ACT
A corporation is a fictitious person, distinct in law
from its members, and is therefore not capable of acting in
propria persona, but acts only through its representatives.
All of the acts, and therefore all the criminal acts, of
the body corporate are in fact the acts of the representa-
tives, though these acts may be imputed in law to the corpo-
ration itself. The responsibility of a corporation is therefore
649 Modern American Law 173.
8 5See infra, Punishment.
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in all cases a vicarious responsibility for the acts of other
persons.
It is contended, however, that since a corporation is au-
thorized to perform only legal acts, any crimes committed
in its name are necessarily ultra vires and noncorporate.
Thus it is said: "How then can an illegal act be imputed to
a corporation? If illegal it cannot be within the limits of
lawful authority; and if not within these limits, it cannot
be the act of the corporation. 67 Chief Justice Tilghman has
thus stated- the argument: "A corporation, says the defend-
ants' counsel, is a mere creature of law and can act only as
authorized by its charter. But the charter does not author-
ize it to do wrong, and therefore it cannot do wrong.
6 8
This argument has been declared to be "fallacious in
its principles and mischievous in its consequences," and
never to "be sanctioned by any court of justice. "69 The
answer usually given to it is that the same reasoning would
result in the irresponsibility of corporations for all wrongs,
civil as well as criminal. If an offense against the criminal
law is necessarily noncorporate, so, it would seem, is an act
which invades only individual rights. This reasoning had
the effect in a few early cases of limiting corporate respon-
sibility to nonfeasance,70 but its effects are so far reaching
and the immunity afforded to corporations thereby so com-
plete that it is practically everywhere repudiated.
70
66St. vs. Louisville & N. R. Co. Tenn.; 19 S. W. 229; Ameri-
can Fork City vs. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 739; Southern Ex.
Co. vs. St. 1 Ga. Ap. 700, 58 S. E. 67. Since a corporation can
act only through Its representative, it cannot be punished as an ac-
cessory to his act. St. vs. Southern R. Co., 145 N. C. 495, 13 L.
R. A. N. S. 966, 59 S. E. 570.
67 See Kenny, Crim. L. 58.
68Chestnut Hill, etc., Turnpike Co. vs. Rutter, 4 S. & R. 676.
See also argument of Binney in 6 Binney 12.
69See preceding note, and St. vs. Morris & E. R. Co.
7OThe argument does not extend to omissions, because they are
done by the corporation and not merely by its representatives. No
fictitious person can do no person what by law it ought not to do,
but it can fall in person to do, what in law It ought. Salmond, Xur-
isprudence 289.
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The responsibility of a corporation for the criminal acts
of its representatives is, it is said, so far as the present ar-
gument is concerned a perfectly logical application of the
law as to an employer's responsibility for the acts of his
servants. The responsibility of the master does not depend
upon. any authority given to the servant to commit the
wrongful act. It is the outcome of an absolute rule of law
that a master is himself answerable for wrongs committed
by his servant in the course and process of doing that which
he is employed to do. In the case of the representatives of
a corporation, the law imputes to the corporation not only
all acts which its representatives are lawfully authorized to
do, but all acts which they do in or about the business so
authorized. 7
1
The plausibility of the argument that a corporation can-
not commit a criminal act is perhaps due to the misuse of
the term "power." A corporation, it is true, is not authorized
by its charter to commit crimes. It has not the "right" or
"privilege" to do so. But it seems that it has the "power"
to commit them. 2
(To be continued)
71C. vs. Pulaski Co. A. vs. M. Assn; St. vs. Morris & E. R.
Co.; Com. vs. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge; Southern R. Co.
vs. St. 125 Ga. 287, 5. Ann. Cas. 411; 14 Columbia Law R. 241.
"The same law that creates the corporation may create the crime,
and to assert that the legislature cannot punish its own creature
because it cannot make a creature capable of violation the law does
not, In my judgment, bear discussion." U. S. vs. MacAndrews,
etc. Co.
7 2Salmond, Juris prudence 289.
"3Wormser, 9 M. A. L. 166.
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WHITING vs. WM. BEAGLE
Promissory Notes--Consideration-Duress-Threat To Prosecute
Maker's Son
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Whiting was the employer of Beagle's son, John, who was
eighteen years of age. He accused John of stealing $100 and threat-
ened to cause his prosecution. Wm. Beagle had an Interview with
him in which he was told, that he, Whiting, would prosecute that
afternoon for larceny unless Beagle gave a note for $100. This Is
assumpsit on the note given. Beagle defends (a) duress and (b) no
consideration. The court found consideration in Whiting's agree-
ment not to exercise the right to prosecute and allow a recovery.
Appeal by Beagle.
Werblun, for the Plaintiff.
Marsden for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WOMER, J. This Is an action on a promissory note given by
William Beagle to Whiting. The defenses are duress and no con-
sideration. The lower court found that there was good considera-
tion in Whiting's promise not to prosecute Beagle's son, John. It
will be necessary for us to decide both of these questions.
It is well settled that to establish the defense of duress it is
not necessary to show that actual violence was used but that mo-
ral compulsion such as that produced by threats may be sufficient
in legal contemplation to destroy free agency without which there
can be no contract. 9 R. C. L. 714. Where a note was obtained
by duress the drawer is not precluded from setting that up as a de-
fense because he retains an indemnity from a liability for which the
note was given. 9 Pa. 14. In the case of Orr vs. Schwartz, 62 Su-
perior 70, the facts are very similar to the case at bar. A daughter
of Schwartz was working for the plaintiff who accused her of lar-
ceny and told the father that unless he paid the money or gave a
note for it the daughter would be immediately prosecuted. In that
case it was held, "that the maker of a promissory note given to a
corporation cannot be held liable where the uncontradicted facts are
that the maker owed the payee nothing, that the note was obtained
by the counsel and a director of the payee through threats that a
daughter of the maker who had been in the employ of the payee
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would be arrested and put in jail unless the father gave the note,
that the father was frightened and alarmed at the threats and exe-
cuted the note when he was in a highly nervous and excited condi-
tion." This was clearly a case in which a felony was compounded.
In National Bank of Oxford vs. Kirk, 90 Pa. 40, it was held that a
promissory note is void where the consideration, therefor, is the
promise of the payee that he will refrain from prosecuting the son
of the maker for forgery. In that case the court cites Section 10
of the act of March 31st, 1860, which reads as follows: If any per-
son having a knowledge of the actual commission of any misprison,
treason, murder, rape, manslaughter, sodomy, burglary, arson, bug-
gery, forgery, housebreaking, larceny, etc.. shall take money,
goods, chattels, lands, or other rewards, or promise thereof, to com-
pound, or conceal, or upon an agreement to compound or conceal,
the crimes aforesaid, every person so doing shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and on conviction thereof shall be sentenced to pay a fine
of not exceeding $1000 and undergo an Imprisonment not exceed-
ing three years. Agreements founded on the suppression of crim-
inal prosecution are void as there is a manifest tendency to subvert
public policy. This was the only consideration In this case.
As stated by C. J. Moschzisker in Sulzner vs. Miller Co., 234
Pa. 162, the doctrine which is now approved by the Judicial mind
both In this country and England is: "That any contradt produced
by actual intimidation ought to be void, whether arising from the
result of merely physical infirmity or from circumstances which
might produce a like effect upon persons of ordinary firmness. Or-
dinarily when no proceedings have commenced threats of arrest,
prosecution do not constitute legal duress to avoid a contract."
While no warrant was exhibited for the arrest of John Beagle, and
no physical violence was applied to William Beagle, it must be
accepted that the continued threats to jail and prosecute his son
and thus disgrace him and his family has no other color, than a
suppression of a charge of larceny. Assuming that this person was
one of reasonble firmness, the imminent and immediate Improson-
ment threatened to his son Induced by the persistent threats of the
plaintiff would reasonably excite and terrorize a father so that his
signature to the note would be solely influenced through such Intim-
idation and would constitute legal duress, so as to Invalidate the
note. Moyer vs. Dodson, 212 Pa. 344; Sulzner vs. Miller Co., 234
Pa. 162. It could not be interpreted as other than such unlawful
and improper pressure as practically destroyed free agency. Duress
is defined to be that degree of constraint or danger either actually
inflicted or threatened and impending which is sufficient In apprehen-
sion or severity to overcome the mind of a person of or-
dinary firmness. It consists not herely In the act of im-
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prisonment or other hardship to which a person was sub-
jected but the state of mind produced by those circum-
stances as would indicate a proper execution of the threat,
may be as effective in inducing a payment of money
or the signing of a note as an actual physical detention.
Where the threat whether of mischief to the personal property or
reputation, is such as to destroy the threatened party's freedom of
will, the law will not enforce a contract executed under such a
threat. Jordon vs. Elliott, 12 W. N. C. 56. As early as the days
of Lord Bacon it was held: "So if a man menace me that he will
imprison or hurt In body my father or my child except I make unto
him an obligation, I shall avoid this as well as If the duress had
been to mine own person." This rule Is as applicable today as
when first announced. We think that the transaction in this case
is what the defendant construes it to be, an arrangement to con-
ceal the knowledge and evidence of the crime and to shield his son
from prosecution.
In the case of Commonwealth ex rel Citizen's National Bank vs.
Camp et al, 258 Pa. 54S, the court said: "It is well settled that the
court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract but will
leave them where it finds them. The plaintiff cannot make it the
basis of his claim nor can the defendant rely upon It to meet the
plaintiff's demand. If the plaintiff can establish his claim without
the assistance of the Illegal contract the court will sustain the con-
tract. Sauer vs. McKees Rocks School District, 243 Pa. 294. In
announcing this decision almost a century ago In Swan vs. Scott,
11 S. & R., it was said the test whether a demand connected with
an illegal transaction Is whether the plaintiff requires the aid of
the illegal transaction to establish his case. If he cannot open his
case without showing that he has broken the law a court will not
assist him whatever he claims and if the illegality be malum pro-
hibition, the plaintiff may recover unless it be directly on the forbid.
den contract. 258 Pa. 548, supra. The court continues to say, the court
properly refused to permit the defendant to show that the consid-
eration for the assignment was an illegal agreement under which the
plaintiff bank promised to suppress all knowledge of a certain mis.
appropriation of funds of the bank by a son-in-law of the former
holder of the stock. We cannot agree with this case but must con-
cur with the case of Orr vs. Schwartz, 62 Superior 70. In the case
of Citizen's National Bank vs. Camp et al, a third party had entered
into the suit and it was an executed contract and we do not think
that the law handed down In that case Is applicable to the case at
bar. Duress and consideration are questions of fact for the jury
and not, questions of law for the court. The Negotiable Instruments
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act of 1901, Section 28 holds that absence or failure of consideration
is a matter of defense as against any person not a holder In dua
course.
In view of the foregoing we must reverse the decision of the
learned trial court and order a new trial.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The payee of the note is suing the maker. A defence Is, want
of consideration. If there was none, the defence is valid, as against
the payee.
If there was any consideration, it seems to have been an agree-
ment not to prosecute the defendant's son. This might be a suffi-
cient consideration; (an agreement not to do what one has a right
to do) if such agreement were legally valid. But, it is not so valid.
The law forbids it, and therefore prevents any such consequences
as would follow a legal agreement.
The learned court below has found duress, to be an obstacle to
enforcement. There may be emotional duress as well as duress
from pain, and we discover no error in the court's decision that
there was duress, which vitiated the promise of the note.
We sustain the decision of the learned court below, upon the
reasons alleged by it.
AFFIRMED.
MORTGAGE OF WVM. STONER v. HENRY SEIP, TERRE TENANT
Real Property - Mortgages - Conveyances - Recording- Form of
Name on Index-Grantor's Name-Mortgagor's Name-Omission
of Middle Initial--Constructive Notice
Borys for ehe Plaintiff.
Miss Davis for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
CARTER, J. Wim. Stoner executed a mortgage using for the
only time a middle initial P. He subsequently conveyed to Henry
Seip the mortgaged land naming himself William Stoner, (No middle
Initial). Subsequently the mortgagee (Plaintiff here issued a scire
faclas on the mortgage making Henry Seip the terre tenant. Seip's
defense is that Stoner habitually called himself William without a
middle name, and that the record of a mortgage by Wm. P. Stoner
was no notice to him. The court below so held, and this Is d mo-
tion for a new trial.
The question in this case is plain and simple. Was there such
notice to Seip as to charge him with knowledge that there was a
mortgage on the property purchased by him? In order to answer
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this question we must look to the facts in the case, and, from
them, determine it.
Stoner had habitually designated himself "William Stoner." He
was known generally by that appellation and by his own acts had
led the public generally to believe that that was his full name.
But, on the particular occasion of executing the mortgage, he sign-
ed his name "William P. Stoner." Was his act in signing "William
P. Stoner" to the mortgage, and having it recorded with such sig-
nature, sufficient notice to Seip, the terre tenant? Upon this ques-
tion this case must turn.
We are inclined to think that there was sufficient notice to
Seip. Ordinary diligence and care in searching the records would
have disclosed the mortgage. It was carelessness in Seip not to
look at the mortgage of William P. Stoner, notwithstanding the
fact that the initial "P" was there. Nor is this view without au-
thority.
In the case of Crippen et al vs. Bergold, et al. in 258 Penna.
469, the court found that the purchaser of land from one commonly
known as Herman Bergold, and signing his name without a middle
initial, is bound to take notice of a prior recorded and indexed mort-
gage covering the same land, executed by the same man, but sign-
ing with a middle initial as Herman A. Bergold. The appellant
was clearly guilty of an oversight in falling to take notice of the
moregage. In the case of Fourth Bleucher Building Assn. vs.'
Halpen, et al. in 270 Penna. 169, the court said, "It is true that a
judgment against Harry L. Halpen there appeared; but, in the ab-
sence of some notice, actual or constructive of the identity of the
defendant in the judgment with the owner of the land, the building
association could not be charged thereby. A contrary conclusion
might be reached if there had been a like location on the mortgage
index; for, in such case the searcher would be put on inquiry, and
opportunity would be presented to determine whether there was
identity of person, since the examination of a mortgage so referred
to, would furnish a description of the property proposed to be
made the subject of a lien, and thus the requisite knowledge would
be obtained."
From this recitation of authorities, and by the application of
sound and judicious reasoning it would seem very clear that Henry
Seip had ample notice of the existence of the mortgage.
New trial granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A man, calling himself in the mortgage, William P. Stoner,
executes it on a piece of land properly described. The same man,
calling himself William Stoner, conveyed the same land in fee. In
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the effort to enforce the mortgage against Henry Seip, the grantee,
he alleges that he had not, when he made the purchase, the notice
to which he was entitled, of the existence of the mortgage.
He looked, as was his duty, at the record of the mortgage and
the mortgage index. He found therein a name very similar to that
of the grantor in the deed. Both mortgage and deed covered the
same land, and the perusal of them would have shown that the
premises in both were identical. From this identity, and the sim-
ilarity of the names, William P. Stoner and Wim. Stoner and the
nearness in time, of the two transactions, there was notice enough
to awaken the belief that the Stoners were one, and the premises
were one; and therefore, that the mortgage was upon the same prem-
ises, put there by the same person as the grantor, L e. that mort-
gagor and grantor and premises were the same. Was the notice
sufficient? We think it was. So thought the court in Crippen
v. Bergold, 258 Pa. 469. The identity of the land put the grantee
on inquiry as to the identity of the mortgagee and mortgagor. We
must hold then, that the mortgage is enforceable against Henry
Seip.
AFFIRMED.
BROTHERS OF M. v. P.
Wills-Power of Appointment-Exercise of Power-Rule Against
Perpetulties
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X devised his home to his widow for life, then to his son M.
for life, and then to such person as he should appoint by will. The
son M. has died and his will appoints his son Erskine to take the
home in fee. Erskine has by will appointed P to take the home
at his death. The right of P is denied by the brothers of M, in-
voking the rule against perpetuities.
Jurchak for the Plaintiff.
Schoenly for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
REYNOLDS, J. The testator in the case at bar attempted to
keep his estate under his control after his death. This is possible
under the law as it exists in Pennsylvania but in order to do so
one must be acquainted with the limitations to such a right. The
instances of attempts followed by failures because of the ignorance
on the part of the testator, as to extent that such right may be ex
ercised, are numerous. A very striking illustration of this type of
case arose in Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, where a testa-
tor attempted to put his estate amounting to six million dollars in
a trust violating the limitations to such right, his entire will fail-
ed by reason of his Ignorance of the rule.
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The rule as stated generally by courts is in the following ter-
minology. "Unless by the terms of its creation the interest must
vest within a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years thereafter,
adding to this a nine months period for gestation." By the terms
of this quotation from Fray on Perpetuities it appears that the
estate must vest within a life or lives in being or twenty-one years
thereafter. It must be certain to vest within that time. A mere
possibility that it will vest does not satisfy the exactions of the
rule. If at the time the interest is created it is seen from a read
ing of the instrument creating it that it will undoubtedly vest with-
in the required time, then the rule is satisfied and the estate is
good. As was said by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, "in so
far as the rule against perpetuities is concerned, the validity of an
-estate created under a power of appointment is determined by its
remoteness, not from the time of its exercise but from the time of
it6 creation, since the appointment is read back into and becomes
part of the instrument creating the power."
The leading case on the point under consideration and the one
which the Pennsylvania courts seem to follow is "In re Powell's
Trust." The following quotations are from Cox vs. DIckson, 256
Pa. 510.
"In re Powell's Trust, 39 L. J. Chancery 188, held that a gen-
eral power to be exercised at death does not constitute ownership,
and that in such case the rule of perpetuities applies."
"Mr. Gray regards the principle of In re Powell's Trust (supra)
as correct, and refuses to accept the doctrine of the late English
cases. He insists that where the donee has a general power of ap-
pointment exerciseable only by will, the validity of the gift made
by the donee must be referred in point of time to the creation of
the power, because the donee is not the owner and cannot appoint
to himself, and no appointment can be made until he dies."
"In Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 223, Mr. J. Green quotes Gray
on Perpetuities, stating that there must be a person with a vested
limited interest who has the immediate right to become the pres-
ent absolute owner. Such is not the case when a life tenant has a
power which he can exercise only by will."
In the case at bar the testator by his will directed that two
life estates should be enjoyed successively and that the second life
tenant should then appoint a person to take. The first part of this
creation is perfectly correct, "a life or lives In being." The son
could direct that any person may take even though it be more than
twenty-one years after the expiration of the lives in being at the
time of the creation of the power and still be within the power
granted by his father but without the time allowed by the rule.
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The mere fact that the exercise is within a time good as against
the rdle does not conclude us. The question, as stated before, Is
whether there was at the time of its creation a possibility that the
final estate with full ownership would be created and vest within
the time allowed. It certainly is very plain that the rule is violat-
ed. in the ce above (Cox vs, Dickson.) the testator created a
life estate with the power of appointment. There the life tenant
exercised her power In such a way that the final complete owner-
ship would not be perfected until after the expiration of the tine
required. In this case such a thing is just as possible although
as the facts finally show it did not happen. The power is to be
read into the will of the first testator and if there is at that time
(the time of its creation) a likelihood that it will not vest within
the time required, the rule is violated and the devise fails. We
think that this is clearly supported by the weight of authority.
including the very late case of Cox vs. Dickson, in Pennsylvania.
The devise in this case must, therefore, fail.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Ve are unable to see how the rule against perpetuities has
been violated.
The devise was, first of a life estate to X's widow. It took
effect immediately for life. The next estate was to the son for his
life. The son was in being when the testator's will went into ef-
fect. His life estate was not suspended on any contingency. It
was vested. The next estate followed the son's life estate. It was
to the appointee by will. But the appointment had to be made
during the son's life, and it took effect simultaneously with his
death. There was no suspension of vesting beyond the death of
the son, that is, beyond a life in being. The estate thus vested,
was a fee. It was to Erskine in fee. Erskine's fee vests then im-
mediately on the close of the life of the son, a life in being when
the will went into effect.
Erskine, having a fee, has given it by his will to P. What
hinders? P does not take in virtue of X's will. Erskine was the
last person who took thereunder, and he took a fee. P's estate Is
not provided for in X's devise, but In that of Erskine. Erskine hav-
ing a fee, had as much right to direct Its devolution by will, as had
X. His direction has not violated the rule against perpetuities.
The judgment of the learned court below must then be
REVERSED.
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ANDERSON vs. STEEL ILL
Negligence-Earning Capacity-Loss of Same-Proof of Loss-Evi-
dence
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Anderson, working In the mill, was seriously hurt by the neg-
ligence of the defendant in not having a safe place in which to
work. In this trespass action he seeks damages. The court told
the jury that he should be compensated for the loss of earning pow-
er, notwithstanding that he was continuing to earn as much as he
had before the injury. Two years before the accident he had earn-
ed by doing a certain kind of work $40 per week. He. had ceased
to do this work and at the time of the accident was earning $30 per
week. The accident had so disabled him that he was unable to re-
sume the kind of work by which he had earned $40 per week. The
court said that the loss of this power should 'he compensated al-
though it had not been used for two years prior to the accident.
Smarsh for the Plaintiff.
Siternthal for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KANTNER, J. This case presents for our determination the
question of whether in an action for personal Injuries the plaintiff
should be permitted to recover damages for the loss of earning pow-
er when he has continued to earn as much after the accident as
he did before. The fact that he has been retained in his former po-
sition at an undiminished wage does not necessarily mean that his
earning power continues to be as great after the Injury as It was
before. The earnings of the plaintiff subsequent to the injury are,
as compared with his earnings prior to the injury, evidence, but
not conclusive, as to whether his injuries have resulted In a per-
manent loss of earning power. McLaughlin vs. Cory, 77 Pa. 109.
Damages are not to be measured by the actual difference in earn-
ings before and after an injury, but the test is whether or not the
capacity to earn has been diminished as a result of the Injury. An
injured man may be retained at his former salary by his employer
out of mere pity, but what assurance has he that the employment
will will continue as long as he needs it. And if such a state of
facts were to bar a recovery for loss of earning capacity it would
make it possible for the employer to limit the amount of damages
in an expected, suit by continuing the wages of the employee until
after judgment, when he might be summarily discharged without
a chance of securing another position. If the injury be of such
character that the plaintiff could not readily secure employment at
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an undiminished salary from persons other than his former em-
ployer, clearly he has suffered a loss of earning power and is en-
titled to damages. Yaeger vs. Anthracite Brewing Co., 259 Pa.
123.
Having decided that loss of earning power is a proper element
of damages in the present case, the question now arises as to
whether the plaintiff should be allowed to show that two years
prior to the injury he had been earning forty dollars per week, In
order to increase the amount of the damages. Upon this question
we flInd some difficulty, as the facts presented are not nearly so
complete or explicit as we might wish, Two years prior to the
accident the plaintiff had earned $40 per week. For how long had
he earned this? Was it his normal and customary employment or
was It a purely temporary position opened to him by chance and
which he might never hope to secure again? Why did he leave
this more lucrative employment, and was. he able to engage in it
immediately before the accident had he so wished? If he could
engage in it now would he receive for the same work the same
wage he had earned two years ago? Did he take employment at a
lower wage merely as a temporary expedient, with the prospect of
soon returning to the more lucrative employment, or had he per-
manently abandoned the latter? As the law appears from the va-
rious camses it would be rash to attempt to define the plaintiff's
rights until these questions are answered.
The plaintiff relies chiefly on DeHaas vs. Penna. R. R. Co.
261 Pa. 499, a negligence suit in which it was held that lessened
capacity to earn In any actually available occupation may be
shown by proper and satisfactory proof. In that case the plain-
tiff had just completed a course in forestry at State College and
was in a position to secure employment as a forester, although he
had not actually done so prior to the Injury. He was permitted
to give evidence of the wages of a forester and recovered on that
basis although he had previously been employed at a lower salary.
The point was that he was competent to fill a more lucrative posi-
tion and clearly expected to do so at an early date. Though not
employed as a forester he had not abandoned that profession.
Another interesting case is that of Clark vs. Butler Junction
Coal Co., 259 Pa. 262, where the plaintiff had for thirty years been
employed as a miner, and four months prior to the accident took
a job as a surface worker at defendant's mine, due to a temporary
depressed condition In the coal market. While so employed he was
injured and thereafter could no longer work under ground when
the mines were reopened. He was permitted to recover the wages
of a miner because he was normally engaged in that occupation
and would have returned to it had the accident not occurred.
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In Helmstetter vs. Pittsburg R. R. Co., 243 Pa. 422, the plain-
tiff had been employed for thirteen years by the city in the capa-
city of a foreman, and continued In that employment with undi-
minished salary after the accident in which he lost a hand and
two fingers of the other hand. Before he had been a foreman he
had worked as a stationary engineer and because of the injury it
would now be Impossible for him to return to that employment.
However the court thought that thirteen years was so long a time
as to indicate a permanent abandonment of the original work. He
had not proven that he was actually capable of working as an en-
gineer immediately before the accident, and so was not permitted
to give evidence of the wages of an engineer.
Wensel vs. Standard Supply & Equipment Co., 72 S. C. 66,
presents an interesting variation of the above case. Here the
plaintiff was permitted to give evidence that he had for a long
time been employed as superintendent of a brick works, though he
had ceased to work In that capacity a year and a half prior to the
accident, and had been employed as an elevator attendant at the
time of the injury. The court allowed the jury to consider his for-
mer employment in assessing damages, but was careful to make it
clear that they should not arbitrarily award the amount he would
have earned could he have re-entered his old employment, but that
they should merely consider the possibility of his being again so
employed.
On the other hand, In Hobel vs. Mahoning & Shenango R. R.
& Light Co., 229 Pa. 507, an action for personal injuries, it was held
to be reversible error to admit testimony as to the earning capacity
of the plaintiff at a period seven years before the accident, while
employed in an entirely different capacity.
From a perusal of the above cited authorities we come to the
conclusion that in estimating the amount of damages to be awarded
the jury is to consider the actual earning capacity of the plaintiff
immediately before the accident and compare it with his capacity
after the injury.
Where prior to the accident, the plaintiff was engaged in an
occupation which does not represent his true and normal earning
capacity, he may prove that in another employment he could earn
more. But such other employment must be actually available to
him as he must have intended to engage in it but for the accident
and must not have permanently abandoned it prior to the accident.
In this case it does not appear that $40 per week represented
the true normal earning capacity of the plaintiff, nor does it ap-
pear that but for the accident he would have been both able and
willing to return to the employment by which he had earned that
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much. The determination of these questions is material and is as
much a matter of fact as any issue in the case. The very broad
ruling of the trial judge appears to have withdrawn these facts
from the consideration of the jury, which to us appears not to be
warranted by the extremely uncertain state of the evidence pre-
sented.
Accordingly the cause is remanded for retrial.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The opinion of the learned court below displays commendable
industry in the search for authorities, and discrimination in the
interpretation of them. We do not dissent from the conclusion that
in estimating the damage suffered by the plaintiff, the jury is to
consider his actual earning capacity immediately before and im-
mediately after the accident. But the question is, was the court
correct in saying that the loss of earning power should be com-
pensated, although it had not been used for two years before the
accident.
If the plaintiff had been a man of wealth, earning nothing by
his physical or mental exertions, could he, if mangled, mutilated,
get no compensation for the loss of the power to earn, should a
turn In his fortune make labor necessary, or even, should a new
social or moral sentiment induce him to desire to labor?
A man has two hands. He has been earning a living by writ-
Ing, in which he has used only the right hand. Is he to get no
compensation for the loss of his left hand, and for the loss of the
power to earn money by means of it? While he was using the
right hand, he had no desire or need to use the left, but, there was
earning power in the left which he might utilize, should he wish to;
or should an accident deprive him of the right hand, and make the
use of the left hand necessary.
A man relying on the favor of friends, or the income from a
little fund, earns nothing. But, he has the corporeal organs for
earning, should he desire or need. He Is deprived of his limbs by
an accident and, at the same time, he loses his friends or his for-
tune. Is he to have no compensation for the loss of the power to
save himself from starvation, because he had not been employing
that power, In the absence of desire or necessity to employ it?
The plaintiff had, two years before his injury been earning $40
per week. After the accident, there was no employment open to
him by which he could earn more than $30. There has been a
subtraction from his earning ability. Why should there be no
compensation for this loss, because for two years, he had not chosen
to use that part of his capacity which earned the $10 per week In
excess of $30. He had had the power; he could have used it, if in-
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clination, interest or necessity prompted. He has since lost the
power. We cannot approve of the doctrine that he must bear the
loss of any earning power of which he was not making use, at the
time of the occurrence of the accident.
We do not understand the learned court below to dispute this
principle. His remarks that "Damages are not to be measured by
the actual difference in earnings before and after an injury, but the
test is whether or not the capacity to earn has been diminished as
a result of the injury," are correct.
The plaintiff had had two years before, the capacity to do a
certain kind of work, and earn $40 per week. If he continued to
have the capacity to do this kind of work till the accident, and was
rendered incapable of doing it thereafter, and it does not appear
that he could continue to do other kinds of work for which he
might get $40 per week, or more than $30 per week, there has been
a loss of the power to earn $10 per week. It matters nothing that
this power was not being used when the accident occurred.
We affirm the judgment of the learned court below, because
we conceive it not to challenge the principles here announced.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
X vs. ARTHUR JAMES
Principal and Surety-Note-Collateral--Security-Defaul--Sale of
Collateral-Application of Proceeds to Unsecured Debt-Dis.
charge of Surety
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John James borrowed $1500.00 from Stapleton, giving a note
with his brother Arthur as security. At the time, but without Ar-
thur's knowledge, he delivered to Stapleton shares of stock in a
corporation as collateral security. Subsequently, Stapleton, on de.
fault of payment of the note, sold the shares for $2000.00 but ap.
plied this amount to another debt of John James. Later, X, who
was one of the creditors of Arthur, issued execution and caused sale
of Arthur's land on a judgment later than that which Stapleton
had entered.
In distribution of proceeds X insists that his debt is to be paid,
that Stapleton was virtually paid by the sale of the collateral se.
curity given by John.
Kirst for the Plaintiff.
Sciotto for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FISHER, J. In this case we have to creditors contending for a
distribution of the shares of Arthur James' estate, Stapleton, who
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holds a judgment, and, X, who has issued execution on a judgment
later than Stapleton's, but who claims that Stapleton has lost his
right to priority by a misapplication of security given to him (Sta-
pleton). The counsel for Stapleton has presented a very meritori-
ous argument which we will proceed to consider. His point is, the
amounts were different, viz., the amount of security as contrasted
to the amount of the debt. There is nothing unusual In this. It
often happens, that business men in need of ready money will give,
to secure a loan, a security, which is greater than the loan, but,
which they either wish to retain or cannot realize upon at the pre-
cise time when the money is needed. This we think wipes away
the difficulty in deciding this case as the case of Beaver Trust Co.
vs. Morgan, 259 Pa. 567 was decided. In that case the Court held,
"Where collateral security is given to the holder of a note, upon
which note there is a surety, if the holder of the note uses the
security for any purpose save that of paying the note, "the surety
is released." The surety has the right to step into the shoes of the
creditor and if forced to pay the note, may demand the collateral,
therefore his right accrues as soon as the note matures. (Hening
on Suretyship).
Stapleton here has misapplied securities which obviously were
to be as collateral for the note in question, thereby relieving Ar-
thur James from his liability as surety.
We think the decision must be for X.
OPINION OP SUPREME COURT
'When C becomes surety for B, in favor of A, the creditor, he
is entitled to the application, in reduction of his liability, of all
property of B, put into the possession or control of A, as security.
Nor is it necessary that he knows of this deposit of security. If A
applies the security to some purpose other than the extinction pro
tanto of the debt, he extinguishes pro tanto, C's liability as surety.
In this case, shares of stock are delivered as collateral security,
by B. C is ignorant of this fact, but his ignorance is immaterial.
Subsequently A, the creditor, sells the securities and obtains more
than enough to pay the note; that is, he obtains $2000, the note be-
ing but $1500. The creditor thus discharges C. But, he has al-
ready a judgment against C for the $1500. A later judgment cred-
itor of C has caused a sheriff's sale of C's land. The right of C
to insist that his obligation to the creditor has been extinguished,
passes to the execution creditor. He may insist as could C, that
the debt to A is discharged. The consequence is that the proceeds
of the sheriff's sale must be paid to the creditor of C, who has
caused the sale by his execution. Cf. Spencer on Suretyship,
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p. 180, et. seq., p. 349; et. seq.; Beaver Trust Co. vs. Morgan, 259
Pa. 567.
The judgment of the learned trial court is
AFFIRMED.
STROUSE vs. A. & B.
Promissory Notes-Duress-Surety-Endorsee-Notice of Defective
Title-Case For Jury
Doyle for the Plaintiff
Hoffman for the Defendant
OPINION OF THE COURT
BROOMALL, J. The facts in this case are that A and B to-
gether executed a note for fifteen hundred dollars, payable to C
within three months. A was coerced into making this note so that
he had a good defense against C but B was not coerced nor did he
know of the coercion. C then endorsed the note to Strouse who
brought an action of assumpsit against both of the makers. Strouse
paid but $750 for the note but no evidence Is given that he had
knowledge that the note was made under duress. He testified that
he had no such knowledge and narrated the circumstances of his
purchase of the note. In this he was not contradicted.
The court allowed the jury to decide whether the plaintiff,
Strouse, knew of the duress or suspected it or some other impeach-
ing fact and added that the disparity between the $1500 and the
$750 was a circumstance strongly pointing to bad faith on Strouse's
part in acquiring the note. The jury below found a verdict for
the defendant and the plaintiff brings this motion for a new trial.
This case involves the Negotiable Instrument Act of 1901 and
that act together with judicial precedents interpreting it must gov-
ern our decision.
Sec. 64 (3 Purdon's Digest 3250) of the N. I. L. provides that
"the title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective
when he obtained the instrument or any signature thereto by
fraud, duress or force, and fear or any other unlawful means when
he negotiates It in breach of faith or under such circumstances as
to amount to a fraud."
It is further provided in Section 65 that "to constitute notice
of an Infirmity In the instrument or defect in the title of the per-
son negotiating it the person to whom it is negotiated must have
actual knowledge of the infirmity or knowledge of such facts that
his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
A, clearly had a good defense against C, because of the duress
admitted to have been practiced upon him. Therefore B had a
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good defense against C. See the opinion of Mestrezat, J., in Foun-
tain vs. Bigham, 235 Pa. 35, where it is held that duress of the
principal will avoid the obligation of the surety If he is aware of
the circumstances which rendered it voidable by the principal. See
also, Osborne vs. Bobbins, 36 N. Y. 365.
We now come to the question whether or not Strouse was a
holder in due course under the N. I. L. A holder in due course
is one who takes a negotiable instrument that is (1) complete and
regular upon his face; (2) that he became owner of it before it was
due without notice of any dishonorment; (3) that he took it In good
faith and for value; (4) at the time of negotiation he took it with-
out knowledge of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
title of the person negotiating it. If he Is a holder in due course
he can recover; if not the motion for a new trial must be dismissed.
Nothing but clear evidence of knowledge or notice, fraud or
bad faith can impeach the title to negotiable paper taken before
maturity. Battles vs. Laudensager, 84 Pa. 446; Simpson vs. Bo-
yard, 74 Pa. 351. One may also be a holder in due course though
he took the instrument under the fact of circumstances that would
have excited the suspicions of a prudent man. McSparran vs.
Neeley, 91 Pa. 17; Lancaster Bank vs. Garber, 178 Pa. 91.
But In an action by a holder in due course of a promissory note
where the defendant shows that the note was procured by the frau-
dulent act of the maker the burden is upon the holder to show that
he is an innocent purchaser for value without notice of the fraud
or duress.
It is for the jury to determine upon the credibility of any wit-
ness though his testimony may have been uncontradicted in any
way. Strouse was a deeply interested party and his testimony
standing alone, though uncontradicted, the court was bound to sub-
mit the question of his credibility to the jury. Second National
tional Bank of Pittsburg vs. Hoffman, 229 Pa. 429.
When establishment of fact depends upon oral testimony the
credibility of any witness or witnesses is for the jury and it Is
their exclusive province to determine whether from such testimony
the fact in dispute has been established. Schultheis vs. Sellers,
223 Pa. 531. Bitner vs. Diehl, 61 Sup. Ct. 482.
Under the sections quoted one who has knowledge of a defect
in his transferor's title or knowledge of such facts that his action
In taking the instrument amounts to bad faith, he is not a holder In
due course. Keene vs. Behan, 40 Wash. 405.
Therefore it being the duty of the jury to determine the fact of
bad faith their verdict In the case must stand. The learned court
below committed no error, In permitting the case to go to the jury.
Motion for novo venire denied.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Duress on a maker of a note, is a defence, as against any hold-
er who became such, with knowledge that It had been exerted on
the maker.
If of two makers, one, B, is a surety, he has the same defence
that the principal maker will have, if he did not know of the du-
ress upon the principal. Here, the surety had no such knowledge.
Both A and B, then can defend against the note, as against Strouse.
unless he is a bona fide holder for value. Ordinarily, a holder is
presumed to be such a holder, but where it is shown that duress
was employed in Inducing the execution of the note, the presump-
tion, until it is rebutted, is that the holder is not a bona fide holder.
for value, or, at least the burden Is on him to show that he is a
bona fide holder for value.
Strouse has testified that he had no knowledge of the circum-
stances that infirm the note, and has narrated the condition of
things when he purchased it. As the learned court below observes,
his credibility was for the jury to assess.
That but one half of the face of the note was paid for it by
Strouse cannot be deemed sufficient to overcome his testimony, as
matter of law. Notes are often bought at a considerable discount,
without suspicion of any that there is a-legal defence against them.
The solvency of the makers may be questionable. The necessity
to employ iitigation, In order to collect, may induce the purchaser
to Insist on an abatement from the amount named in the note.
The urgent need of money, may prevail on the payee to part with
the note for ready money much less in amount than the face value.
The court could not decide what the cause for the sale of the $1500
note for $750 was. That duty was the Jury's. Bitner vs. Diehl,
61 Superior 483.
We think the trial court was In error In Instructing the Jury
that the sale to Strouse for $750, of the note, was a circumstance
"strongly pointing to bad faith" on Strouse's part. There is reason
to fear that it Induced a verdict which, without It would not have
been rendered.
While the opinion of the learned court below Is tersely and
neatly expressed, we are obliged to think that Its decision should
have been different.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Cases on the Law of Bills and Notes by Howard L. Smith, Pro-
fessor of Law of the University of Wisconsin and Win. Underhill
Moore, Professor of Law in Columbia* University. West Publishing
Company, St. Paul, Minn.
No two compilers of cases on any subject will coincide in their
selections, in a majority of instances. It is therefore sometimes dif-
ficult to compare case books and to pronounce of one that it is bet-
ter than anothers. The book we are reviewing, is commended by
the character of the gentlemen who have compiled it and of the
general editor, Win. R. Vance, of the American Case Book Series,
and by the reputation of the West Publishing Co., the publishers.
The book has been in use in a considerable number of law schools,
and will be in use in the Dickinson School of Law. It covers 800
pages, and contains a large number of the famous and significant
cases, on the subject of Negotiable Instruments. We know noth-
ing better, and hesitate to say that there is any other compilation of
cases on Bills and Notes as good. Student or lawyer desiring a
convenient repertory of the decisions on this interesting and impor-
tant subject, would do well to possess it.
Cases on International Law, principally selected from decisions
of English and American Courts, by James Brown Scott. American
Case Book Series. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.
This is one of the most important volumes in the American
Case Book Series. Its editor is an authority of the first order. The
range of his selections is very extensive. Most of the interesting
and decisive adjudications of the English and American Courts, on
international questions, are included. The work covering 1200
pages, is divided into three parts, and it has three appendices, con-
taining extremely valuable material. Part 1 deals with the rights
and duties of nations in time of peace. Part II treats of compul-
sive measures or redress in time of peace; and Part III considers
rights and duties of nations in time of war. Appendix I reproduces
the Covenant of the League of Nations, and exhibits the statute
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for the permanent court of international justice provided for by
Art. 14, of the Covenant of the League. The 2nd Appendix em-
braces the Declaration of Paris, the Declaration of St. Petersburg,
the Declaration concerning asphyxiating gases, concerning expand-
ing bullets, etc. The third Appendix contains sundry orders in
council. The collection of cases is prefixed by an interesting pre-
face in which the author unfolds his views as to the nature of in-
ternational law. The work can be unreservedly commended, as a
library of the important adjudications by Anglo-Saxon jurists on
the most interesting questions that arise between nations.
